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ABSTRACT: I argue that an attractive theory about the metaphysics of belief – the 
pragmatic, interpretationist theory endorsed by Stalnaker, Lewis, and Dennett, among 
others – implies that agents have a novel form of voluntary control over their beliefs. 
According to the pragmatic picture, what it is to have a given belief is in part for that 
belief to be part of an optimal rationalization of your actions. Since you have voluntary 
control over your actions, and what actions you perform in part determines what beliefs 
you count as having, this theory entails that you have some voluntary control over your 
beliefs. However, the pragmatic picture doesn’t entail that you can believe something as 
a result of intention to believe it. Nevertheless, I argue that the limited sort of voluntary 
control implied by the pragmatic picture may be of use in vindicating the deontological 
conception of epistemic justification.  
KEYWORDS: rationality, pragmatism, doxastic voluntarism, epistemic 
deontology 
 
Introduction 
Do agents have voluntary control over what they believe? Philosophers almost 
universally hold that the answer is ‘no.’1 Instead, these philosophers maintain, 
belief formation is a passive affair, something that happens to the agent, as it were, 
when her evidence comes to support (or, in the bad case, when she merely takes 
her evidence to support) the proposition in question.  
This negative conclusion certainly has the support of intuition. If you take 
some proposition (say, that it will rain tomorrow) and consider whether you are 
able to bring yourself to believe it, you will almost certainly conclude that you are 
not. But as I will argue, a mild and peculiar form of voluntary control over our 
beliefs follows from an attractive theory of the nature of belief, according to 
which what it is to have a belief is explained partly in terms of its link with action. 
According to such a pragmatic picture of belief, whether an agent has a given 
belief is determined in part by how she acts. In particular, whether an agent has a 
                                                                
1 There are subtleties about direct vs. indirect, and immediate vs. long-term voluntary control, 
which will crop up later. But let’s start out simple. 
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given belief is determined in part by how well attributing to her that belief would 
rationalize and explain her actions. Since an agent has voluntary control over her 
actions, and hence has control over one of the key factors that determine what she 
counts as believing, she thereby also has some voluntary control over what she 
believes. This, in a nutshell, is the argument from the pragmatic picture to the 
conclusion that agents have at least some voluntary control over what they 
believe.  
While the pragmatic picture entails that we have some voluntary control 
over our beliefs, the form this voluntary control takes is peculiar. One might think 
that having voluntary control over what one believes involves being able (in some 
cases) to come to believe a proposition as a result of executing an intention to 
come to believe it. But, as I will argue, the pragmatic picture of belief will likely 
not have this consequence. On the view I sketch here, there are cases where if you 
act one way, you will count as having one set of beliefs, while if you act another 
way, you will count as having some other set of beliefs, and moreover it is under 
your voluntary control whether to act in the one way or the other. However, 
there are no cases where you can come to believe a proposition as a result of 
executing an intention or decision to believe that proposition. For in cases where 
you form the intention to believe p and subsequently act as if p is true, those 
subsequent actions will be better rationalized and explained by interpreting you 
not as believing p, but rather as merely desiring to believe p, or desiring to appear 
to believe p, or something of the sort. (For this reason, the resulting view may not 
merit the name ‘doxastic voluntarism,’ if this is taken to require voluntary control 
over beliefs via belief-forming intentions.)  
Nevertheless, I will suggest that the more indirect kind of voluntary control 
over beliefs that follows from the pragmatic picture may be sufficient to defend 
what Alston2 has called ‘the deontological conception of epistemic justification,’ 
on which beliefs are aptly evaluated using deontic concepts like ought, obligation, 
permission, and the like.  
1. The Pragmatic Picture of Belief 
The pragmatic theory of the nature of belief holds that what it is to have a given 
belief is for attributing that belief to you to be part of an optimal explanation of 
your behavior. This sort of pragmatic picture has been defended by Lewis,3 
                                                                
2 See William Alston, “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification,” Philosophical 
Perspectives 2 (1988): 257-99. 
3 See David Lewis, “Radical Interpretation,” Synthese 27 (1974): 331-44. 
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Stalnaker,4 and Dennett,5 among others.6 Here is Stalnaker sketching the 
approach:  
Here is one impressionistic picture of human activities which involve mental 
representation – call it the pragmatic picture. Rational creatures are essentially 
agents. Representational mental states should be understood primarily in terms 
of the role that they play in the characterization and explanation of action... And, 
according to this picture, our conceptions of belief and of attitudes pro and con 
are conceptions of states which explain why a rational agent does what he does. 
Some representational mental states – for example, idle wishes, passive hopes, 
and theoretical belief - may be connected only very indirectly with action, but 
all must be explained, according to the pragmatic picture, in terms of their 
connections with the explanation of rational action.7 
One way to get a grip on the pragmatic theory of belief (and mental states 
more generally) is to imagine an ideal interpreter who knows everything about 
your behavior and environment and uses this knowledge to come up with a theory 
of your mental life. This ideal interpreter aims to attribute to you those mental 
states which together constitute the best explanation of your behavior. Whether 
some attribution of mental states to you is a good explanation of your behavior 
depends in large part on whether it is a good rationalization of your behavior, that 
is, whether it makes your actions come out rational. Crucially, this interpreter is 
not to be thought of as making hypotheses about what mental states you really 
have, hypotheses which could turn out to be false. Rather, what mental states you 
have at a time just are whatever mental states this ideal interpreter would 
attribute to you at that time. (Multiple competing attributions of mental states will 
typically be compatible with your acting as you do, but these may not all be 
equally good explanations and rationalizations of your actions. But if multiple 
competing attributions of mental states are tied with respect to how well they 
explain and rationalize your behavior, then it is indeterminate what mental states 
you have.)8 
                                                                
4 See Robert Stalnaker, Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987). 
5 See Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).  
6 The pragmatic picture is sometimes referred to as ‘functionalism,’ but the term ‘functionalism’ 
has also been applied to views that do not qualify as versions of the pragmatic picture (e.g. views 
which simply espouse a computational theory of the mind). Still, we can say that the pragmatic 
picture is one version of functionalism about the mind. 
7 Stalnaker, Inquiry, 4. 
8 For discussion, see Alan Hàjek and Michael Smithson, “Rationality and Indeterminate 
Probabilities,” Synthese 187 (2012): 33-48. They also highlight the parallel between Lewis’ 
theory of mental states and his theory of laws and chances.   
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As noted, the pragmatic theory of belief gives a central role to principles of 
charity which favor a given attribution of beliefs to an agent to the extent that 
such an attribution makes the agent come out rational. On sensible versions of the 
pragmatic theory of belief, making the agent’s actions come out looking rational in 
light of her beliefs is just one part of making the agent come out rational as a 
whole (see Christensen9 and Meacham and Weisberg10 for related discussion). We 
also want the agent’s beliefs to come out rational in light of her evidence,11 for 
instance. And we want her beliefs to connect in sensible ways with her emotions, 
for instance whether she would experience surprise or disappointment if she were 
to learn that the proposition is false.12 This is important, since there will typically 
be many different alternative sets of mental states that would recommend the 
actions the agent in fact takes (for instance, there are many credence-utility 
function pairs that assign highest expected utility to actions the agent performs), 
but these will not all be on a par with respect to how well they fit with the agent’s 
evidence and emotions, for instance. It’s also important to note that these different 
interpretational factors will sometimes conflict. For instance, it may be that the 
beliefs that would be most rational in light of the agent’s evidence would not 
recommend the actions the agent in fact takes, or vice versa. Any particular 
version of the pragmatic theory will have to assign weights to the different factors, 
saying for instance how important it is that the beliefs attributed to the agent 
come out as rational in light of her evidence,13 how important it is that the beliefs 
                                                                
9 See David Christensen, “Preference-Based Arguments for Probabilism,” Philosophy of Science 
68 (2001): 356-76.  
10 See Christopher Meacham and Jonathan Weisberg, “Representation Theorems and the 
Foundations of Decision Theory,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2011): 641-63.  
11 Note that insofar as an agent’s evidence is determined by her mental states, a direct pragmatic 
picture of mental states in general (not just belief) will entail that what counts as her evidence is 
determined by the same explanatory considerations that determine what she counts as 
believing. 
12 The addition of these other constraints is part of what separates the sophisticated versions of 
the pragmatic picture advocated by Lewis, Stalnaker, and Dennett from implausibly crude 
versions. In the case of doxastic attitudes, such a crude version might take having a given 
credence in a proposition to be just a matter of betting at certain odds on that proposition. In the 
case of conative attitudes, a good example might be revealed preference theory, where 
preferring A to B just is a matter of choosing, or being disposed to choose, A over B when 
offered a choice between them. These ham-fisted views connect attitudes only with actions, and 
not with other things like what evidence one has, or what emotions one displays. 
13 Because these different factors will often conflict, so that interpreters will often be unable to 
have agents come out as perfectly rational, the pragmatic theory will also need some measure of 
how far different suboptimal cases diverge from the ideally rational case. For instance, it will 
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attributed to the agent recommend the actions she performs, etc. The beliefs that 
the agent actually has, then, are those that score best overall, give the weights 
assigned by the theory to these different factors.  
Still, what is crucial for present purposes is simply that what an agent 
believes is determined in part by how she acts. Lewis14 expresses the point with 
his Rationalization Principle, where Ao expresses what propositional attitudes an 
agent has, expressed in our language, P is our ultimate data set, described in purely 
physical terms, and Karl is the agent to whom we are attributing beliefs and 
desires:  
The Rationalization Principle15 constrains the relation between Ao and P: Karl 
should be represented as a rational agent; the beliefs and desires ascribed to him 
by Ao should be such as to provide good reasons for his behavior, as given in 
physical terms by P. Thus if it is in P that Karl’s arm goes up at a certain time, Ao 
should ascribe beliefs and desires according to which it is a good thing for his 
arm to go up then. I would hope to spell this out in decision-theoretic terms, as 
follows. Take a suitable set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive 
propositions about Karl’s behavior at any given time; of these alternatives, the 
one that comes true according to P should be the one (or: one of the ones) with 
maximum expected utility according to the total system of beliefs and desires 
ascribed to Karl at that time by Ao. 
                                                                                                                                       
require a view not just about what beliefs would be perfectly rational in light of the agent’s 
evidence, but also how irrational alternative beliefs states would be given that evidence, and it 
will require a view not just about what action would be most rational in light of a given set of 
beliefs and desires, but also how irrational other actions would be in light of those beliefs and 
desires. Note also that different versions of the pragmatic theory will also result from different 
theories of rationality. For instance, pragmatic theorists who are also causal decision theorists 
will sometimes disagree with pragmatic theorists who are evidential decision theorists about 
which beliefs would be an optimal rationalization of the agents’ actions, since they disagree 
about the nature of rational action. And similarly for different theories about which beliefs are 
supported by which bodies of evidence. In this way, the pragmatic theory is more of a general 
picture of belief, with particular theories resulting from different ways of filling in that picture. 
14 Lewis, “Radical Interpretation,” 337. 
15 Lewis’ Rationalization Principle is one of the principles that I have called ‘principles of 
charity.’ In Lewis’ terminology, he distinguishes between the Rationalization and the Principle 
of Charity. The latter says that agents should (ceteris paribus) be interpreted as having beliefs 
and desires which are themselves rational, while the former says that agents should (ceteris 
paribus) be interpreted as having beliefs and desires which make their actions rational in light of 
those beliefs and desires. Both the Principle of Charity and the Rationalization Principle have us 
aim to attribute beliefs and desires to an agent so as to make the agent come out as rational as 
possible overall. 
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If the pragmatic theory of belief is true, then you have voluntary control 
over some of the factors – your actions – which determine what you believe. If 
believing that p is in part a matter of acting as if p (i.e. acting in a way that would 
satisfy your desires if p were true), then by acting as if p you can contribute to 
making it the case that you believe p. This means that there will be possible cases 
in which, by acting one way rather than another, it will be the case that you 
believe some given proposition rather than not.16 
A slight complication: On some versions of the pragmatic theory, it is not 
the agent’s actions themselves which are in the first instance to be rationalized by 
the beliefs (and desires) attributed to her, but rather the agent’s dispositions to act, 
which may or may not be manifested on any given occasion. I take it, however, 
that such a version of the pragmatic theory would still yield a limited form of 
voluntary control over beliefs, for not only the actions you actually perform, but 
also your dispositions to act in certain ways, are to some extent under your 
voluntary control. Henceforth I will ignore this minor complication and consider 
only the simpler version of the pragmatic theory on which it is the agent’s actual 
actions which are to be rationalized by the beliefs (and desires) attributed to the 
agent.  
The pragmatic picture of belief is structurally similar to the best-system 
analysis of laws of nature, and the way in which (I claim) agents have some 
voluntary control over what they believe has a structural analogue in the so-called 
‘undermining futures’ which can arise in the context of objective chances in a 
best-system analysis. Here is Lewis describing the best-system analysis of laws:  
Take all deductive systems whose theorems are true. Some are simpler, better 
systematized than others. Some are stronger, more informative, than others. 
These virtues compete: an uninformative system can be very simple, an 
unsystematized compendium of miscellaneous information can be very 
informative. The best system is the one that strikes as good a balance as truth will 
allow between simplicity and strength. How good a balance that is will depend 
                                                                
16 Another view of the metaphysics of belief that allows for a limited form of voluntary control 
over one’s beliefs is one on which believing p is a matter of being disposed to treat P as a 
premise in practical reasoning. See Richard Holton, “Intention as a Model for Belief,” in 
Rational and Social Agency: Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Bratman, ed. Manuel Vargas 
and Gideon Yaffe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014) and Jacob Ross and Mark 
Schroeder, “Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 88 (2014): 259-88. Treating something as a premise in reasoning is a sort of action, 
albeit a mental one. On this picture, then, your beliefs are under your voluntary control to the 
extent that your dispositions to perform certain actions are under your voluntary control. 
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on how kind nature is. A regularity is a law iff it is a theorem of the best 
system.17 
Note the similarity between the pragmatic picture of belief and the best-
system analysis of laws. The best-system analysis says that what it is for something 
to be a law is for it to play a role in the best explanation of a certain pattern 
(namely, the complete world history). The pragmatic picture says that what it is 
for someone to have a given belief is for attribution of that belief to play a role in 
the best explanation of a certain pattern (namely, that agent’s behavior). (An 
important difference is that what the laws are will not change over time, as least 
on standard theories, whereas what your beliefs are will change.)  
Now I want to point out the analogy between the form of voluntary control 
over beliefs that follows from the pragmatic picture and the undermining futures 
that are possible given the best-system analysis of laws. First, let’s look at how to 
incorporate objective chances into the best-system analysis. Here again is Lewis:  
Consider deductive systems that pertain not only to what happens in history, but 
also to what the chances are of various outcomes in various situations -  for  
instance, the decay probabilities for atoms of various isotopes... As before, some 
systems will be simpler than others. Almost as before, some will be stronger than 
others: some will say either what will happen or what the chances will be when 
situations of a certain kind arise, whereas others will fall silent both about the 
outcomes and about the chances. And further, some will fit the actual course of 
history better than others. That is, the chance of that course of history will be 
higher according to some systems than according to others... The virtues of 
simplicity, strength, and fit trade off. The best system is the system that gets the 
best balance of all three. As before, the laws are those regularities that are 
theorems of the best system. But now some of the laws are probabilistic. So now 
we can analyse chance: the chances are what the probabilistic laws of the best 
system say they are.18 
On standard versions of the best-system analysis of laws, facts about what 
happens in the future are among the facts that determine what the laws are right 
now. For the same reason, on standard versions of the best-system analysis of 
chance, facts about what happens in the future are among the facts that determine 
what the chances are right now. As Lewis writes, this will be true if  
present chances supervene upon the whole of history, future as well as present 
and past; but not upon the past and present alone.19 
                                                                
17 See David Lewis, “Humean Supervenience Debugged,” Mind 103 (1994): 478.  
18 Lewis, “Humean Supervenience Debugged,” 480. 
19 Lewis, “Humean Supervenience Debugged,” 482. 
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If this is correct, then given what the present chances actually are, there is a 
non-zero chance that some future will obtain such that, if it were to obtain, the 
present chances would be different from what they actually are. To take Lewis’ 
example, the actual half-life of tritium is 12.26 years (i.e. the chance that a given 
tritium atom will decay within 12.26 years is 0.5). But there is also  
some minute present chance that far more tritium atoms will exist in the future 
than have existed hitherto, and each one of them will decay in only a few 
minutes.20 
If this were to happen, then it would constitute a  
chancemaking pattern on which the half-life of tritium would be very much less 
than the actual 12.26 years.21  
Now, the possibility of such ‘undermining futures’ is of interest to 
philosophers of science primarily because it creates a conflict between the best-
system analysis and plausible claims about how one ought to respond to evidence 
about objective chances, especially the Principal Principle of Lewis.22 But for 
present purposes, what is important is just the observation that on the best-system 
analysis of chance, facts about how things go right now and in the future can 
make a difference to what the present chances are. And by the same token, on a 
pragmatic picture of belief, facts about how you act right now and in the future (at 
least, the very near future) can make a difference to what your present beliefs are.  
Suppose, for instance, that for each of a number of tritium atoms, you are 
offered a bunch of bets at various odds on whether the tritium atom will decay 
within 12.26 years. In particular, for each tritium atom, and for all n between 0 
and 1 (inclusive) have the option of accepting or declining a bet which pays you 
$n if the tritium atom decays within 12.26 years and pays you $(n-1) otherwise. 
Note that having credence x that the given tritium atom will decay would license 
accepting all and only the bets where n is greater than or equal to x (in the sense 
that that bet would have non-negative expected value, given that credence).23 If, 
then, you accept all and only the bets where n is greater than or equal to 0.5, this 
behavioral pattern is one that would be best explained and rationalized by your 
having 0.5 credence that a given tritium atom would decay within 12.26 years. By 
                                                                
20 Lewis, “Humean Supervenience Debugged,” 482. 
21 Lewis, “Humean Supervenience Debugged,” 482. 
22 See David Lewis, “A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance,” in Studies in Inductive Logic 
and Probability, ed. Richard Jeffrey (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 83-132.  
23 I’m assuming that you only care about money, and that you don’t have decreasing marginal 
utility for money. The story gets more complicated once we drop these simplifying assumptions, 
but the basic point is the same. 
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contrast, if you accept all and only the bets where n is greater than or equal to 
0.25, this behavioral pattern is one that would be best explained by your having 
only 0.25 credence that a given tritium atom would decay within 12.26 years. Of 
course, there are other factors that, on the pragmatic picture, help determine what 
your beliefs (or credences) are, for instance what evidence you have encountered, 
how surprised you would feel if you learned that the given proposition is false, 
and the like. But given that how you act is among the factors that determine what 
you believe, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that there will be at least one 
possible case where which bets you accept at time t affects what credences you 
have at t regarding tritium atom decay (just imagine a case where the two 
alternative beliefs states are on a par with respect to these other factors, so that 
your actions can tip the balance one way or the other). Since how you bet is 
(presumably) under your voluntary control, this would also be a case where what 
you believe, indeed what you believe right now, about tritium atom decay, is to 
some extent under your voluntary control.  
Importantly, this sort of case is unlike a case in which you cause your later 
self to have a given belief by taking some belief-inducing pill or by giving your 
later self new evidence (Feldman24 notes that you can cause your later self to 
believe that the lights are on by flipping the light switch). This is a case where you 
can affect what you believe right now by how you act right now. By accepting all 
and only the bets that appear fair or favorable relative to credence n in a given 
proposition, you make it the case that you count as having that credence n right 
before you accepted the bets (here assuming that other interpretational factors, 
like whether that credence would be supported by the evidence you had then, do 
not conflict with this assignment of credences). 
Note that we can get an analogue of undermining futures on the pragmatic 
picture. Suppose that in fact you accept all and only the bets where n is greater 
than or equal to 0.5, so that your actions are best explained and rationalized by 
your having 0.5 credence that a given tritium atom will decay within 12.26 years. 
And suppose that the other factors in the supervenience base for your 
beliefs/credences are neutral with respect to which credence-attribution they 
support (so, for instance, you have not been exposed to information that would 
rationalize one particular credence over another). So, assuming that the pragmatic 
picture is correct, you in fact have 0.5 credence that a given tritium atom will 
decay within 12.26 years. However, had you acted in some other way, say by 
accepting all and only the bets where n is greater than or equal to 0.25, then you 
                                                                
24 See Richard Feldman, “The Ethics of Belief,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 
(2000): 667-95.  
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would have had some credence other than the 0.5 credence that you actually 
have. Therefore, just as the best-system analysis of chance allows for possible 
futures such that, if they obtained, the chances would be different from what they 
actually are, so the pragmatic picture allows for possible courses of action such 
that, if you had performed them, your beliefs would be different from what they 
actually are.  
It is important to note that the sort of voluntary control over one’s beliefs 
that I am claiming follows from the pragmatic picture of belief is very weak. This 
is precisely because how you act right now is only one factor among many that 
determine what you count as believing. Again, other factors include how you 
acted in the past and how you will act later in the future, as well as what 
information you have encountered and what emotions or other responses you are 
disposed to have under various conditions. And these other factors are not (or at 
least, not typically) right now under your voluntary control. In many cases, these 
other factors will point strongly in one direction, supporting some particular 
attribution of beliefs to you, such that even if you acted in a way that would not 
be rationalized by those beliefs, you would still count as having them. Your action 
would then count as a case of one-off irrationality.  
For instance, if you have seen lots of polling that shows the Republicans 
leading in the midterms, then if you were to nonetheless bet (at even odds) on the 
Democrats, this would not be enough to make it the case that you believed that 
the Democrats would win. For the fact that you have strong evidence that the 
Republicans will win means that attributing to you the belief that the Democrats 
will win would require interpreting you in such a way that your beliefs turn out 
highly irrational (even though it would make your actions come out rational in 
light of your beliefs). Of course, we do sometimes interpret agents as having 
irrational beliefs; it’s just that the principle of charity says we should try to avoid 
that result if possible (subject to other constraints). So, if you have strong evidence 
that the Republicans will win, then if you still bet on the Democrats, it would be 
natural to interpret you as believing the Republicans will win, with your betting 
actions counting as irrational, or perhaps as expressive acts showing your support 
for the Democrats, or an attempt to trick others into thinking you believed the 
Democrats would win, or something of that sort.  
Only one of the components of the supervenience base of your beliefs, 
namely, how you act right now, is under your present voluntary control. It is for 
this reason that even on the pragmatic theory, cases where you can affect what 
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you believe right now by how you act right now will be rare. I only claim that 
they are possible.25 
Let me close this section with a few words about what the pragmatic picture 
says about voluntary control over mental states other than belief. The pragmatic 
picture of Lewis, Stalnaker, and Dennett is not merely a theory about belief, but 
also a theory about a range of other propositional attitudes,26 in particular desires 
(or preferences) and intentions. For instance, whether an agent counts as having a 
certain set of desires (or preferences) depends on whether those desires would 
rationalize and explain her actions. (As with beliefs, though, it will also depend on 
whether those desires would themselves be rational, and on how those desires 
connect with her emotional dispositions, for instance whether she would 
                                                                
25 Daniel Greco, in “The Impossibility of Skepticism,” Philosophical Review 121 (2012): 317-58, 
distinguishes between direct and indirect pragmatic picture of belief. The direct pragmatic 
picture is the one I have been considering. On the indirect pragmatic picture, the link between 
belief and action is (as the name suggests) more indirect. As he puts it, the indirect pragmatic 
picture has it that “a proposition p counts as believed by an agent if a representation with the 
content that p is produced by a belief-producing psychological mechanism of that agent,” where 
“for a system that produces representations to count as a belief-producing system, it must have 
the function of producing representations that play the action-guiding, rationalizing role that 
the advocate of the direct pragmatic picture thinks beliefs must play” (337). Whether some form 
of voluntary control follows from the indirect pragmatic picture depends on what determines 
the function of a representation-producing system. If the function of such a system is fixed by 
the past evolutionary, selective history of that system (yielding something like the biosemantic 
picture of belief defended in Ruth Millikan, “Biosemantics,” Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989): 
281-97), then no form of voluntary control will follow, for the function of the relevant 
representation-producing system is fixed by facts about the past which are not under her 
present control. On the other hand, if the function of a representation-producing system is 
determined by, say, species-wide regularities (e.g., whether in typical members of the species, 
the representations it produces play a belief-like role in guiding and rationalizing action), then a 
very weak form of voluntary control will follow. This is because an agent’s present actions play 
a role in determining whether the representations produced by a given representation-
producing system play a belief-like role in guiding action. Hence, her actions play a role in 
determining whether that representation-producing system counts as a belief-producing system. 
Then, in marginal cases, she might be able to tip the balance and make one of the 
representation-producing systems in her head count as a belief-producing system, and thereby 
make it the case that she counts as believing whatever representations that system produced. 
These cases will be exceedingly rare, and so the form of voluntary control that follows from this 
version of the indirect pragmatic picture will be even weaker than that which follows from the 
direct pragmatic picture. This is unsurprising, since the link between belief and action is weaker 
and less direct on the indirect pragmatic picture than on the direct pragmatic picture. 
26 Recall that in the quote from Stalnaker above, he mentions ‘idle wishes, passive hopes, and 
theoretical belief’ in addition to ordinary beliefs. 
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experience a feeling of disappointment if those desires were frustrated.) And 
whether an agent counts as having some intention depends on whether that 
intention would rationalize her actions. Because these other mental states are also 
explained in part by their connection with the explanation of rational action, an 
agent will in some cases be able to determine which of those mental states she has 
by how she acts, and hence will have some voluntary control over those mental 
states.  
By contrast, it is more questionable whether the pragmatic picture applies 
to mental states with a strong phenomenal component. It is questionable, for 
instance, whether it applies to states of having certain qualia, like there seeming to 
be a red thing in front of me.27 Plausibly, these states are characterized by their 
subjective feel, not (or at least not to any great extent) by their connection to 
rational action. A more difficult intermediate case is that of certain emotions like 
fear, anger, and surprise, which involve a phenomenal component but are not 
mere phenomenal states. Griffiths28 argues that certain ‘core’ emotions, such as 
fear, surprise, anger, disgust, sadness, and joy, are automatic responses to 
environmental stimuli characterized by their associated physiological changes and 
their evolutionary phylogeny29 the same emotions, associated with similar 
physiological changes, in other animals such as dogs), rather than by their 
connection with rational action. (However, Griffiths doesn’t think that this story 
applies to certain higher cognitive emotions like jealousy and guilt, for instance.) 
If that story about the core emotions is on the right track, then the pragmatic 
picture will not entail that they are in any sense under our voluntary control, 
because the pragmatic picture doesn’t apply to them; what core emotions one 
counts as having doesn’t depend on whether attribution of those emotional states 
would explain and rationalize one’s actions, but rather on facts about physiology 
and evolutionary history. Of course, there is much more to be said about 
phenomenal and emotional states, and their connection to the pragmatic picture. 
My point is simply that the pragmatic picture doesn’t entail that all of our mental 
states are in any sense under our voluntary control, since the pragmatic picture 
likely doesn’t apply to all mental states, but only those characterized by their 
connection with rational action.  
                                                                
27 See Jaegwon Kim, Physicalism, or Something near Enough (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007). 
28 See Paul Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
29 See Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (Originally 
published 1872. Reprinted by University of Chicago Press, 1965).  
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2. Voluntary Control and the Deontological Conception 
I have argued that on a pragmatic picture of belief, your beliefs are partly under 
your voluntary control, since part of the supervenience base for your beliefs, 
namely your actions, are under your voluntary control. This is an interesting 
result, in part because the form this voluntary control takes is peculiar and 
unexpected. But does it have any broader relevance? In this section, I discuss how 
the pragmatic picture of belief bears on one topic of central importance in 
discussions of voluntary control over beliefs, namely the deontological conception 
of epistemic justification.  
According to the deontological conception of epistemic justification, 
justification has to do with requirements, prohibitions, and permissions, so that 
(for instance), a belief is justified just in case it is permitted by the relevant 
epistemic norms. Thus, beliefs can appropriately be evaluated using ordinary 
deontic concepts such as obligation, permission, ought, and the like, and it’s 
appropriate to say that an agent is obligated to hold a certain belief, given her 
evidence, or that a certain belief is permissible, or that an agent ought not have 
the beliefs she has, and so forth. Alston30 criticizes this conception of epistemic 
justification by first arguing that beliefs must be under some sort of voluntary 
control in order for deontic concepts such as requirement, prohibition, and 
permission to apply to them (by appeal to the principle that ought implies can), 
and then arguing that we lack the requisite voluntary control over our beliefs.  
Of course, whether Alston’s argument is sound depends on what sort of 
voluntary control is needed in order for the relevant deontic concepts to be 
applicable to beliefs. And it is by no means clear and uncontroversial what sort of 
voluntary control is at issue. (A closely related issue is what it would take to 
believe ‘at will,’ and Peels31 identifies eight different conceptions of believing at 
will that have been discussed in the literature.)  
An initial thought, and one to which Alston seems sympathetic, gives pride 
of place to intentions (or, perhaps, choices or decisions).32 On this view, having 
the relevant sort of voluntary control over whether you  is a matter of being able 
to  as a result of executing an intention to  (and, presumably, being able to not-
 as a result of executing an intention to not-). So, having the relevant sort of 
                                                                
30 Alston, “The Deontological Conception.” 
31 See Rik Peels, “Believing at Will is Possible,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2014): 1-
18.  
32 Alston (“The Deontological Conception,” 259) writes that according to the principle that 
ought implies can, “one can be obliged to do A only if one has an effective choice as to whether 
to do A.” 
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voluntary control over whether you believe p is a matter of being able to believe p 
as a result of an intention to believe p, and being able not to believe p as a result of 
an intention not to believe p.33 
But in my earlier discussion, I said nothing about intentions to believe. For 
all that I have said, it might be that in some cases, by acting one way rather than 
another, you can make it the case that you have one set of beliefs rather than 
another, even though it is impossible for you to form an intention to believe p  
and have that intention cause you to come to believe p. After all, in the cases I 
have imagined, by acting one way rather than another, you make it the case that 
you already had the one set of beliefs rather than the other. So our ideal 
interpreter would not interpret you as having intended to have the one set of 
beliefs and thereby causing yourself to acquire those beliefs.  
In this respect, there is another illuminating analogy between the sort of 
voluntary control that I think follows from the pragmatic picture and Lewis’ best-
system analysis of laws. Lewis is a compatibilist about free will. Lewis34 imagines 
that determinism is true and that in fact he put his hand down on his desk and did 
not raise it. This action was predetermined but nonetheless free. It was 
predetermined since there is a true historical proposition h specifying the intrinsic 
state of the world long ago, and a true proposition l specifying the (deterministic) 
laws of nature, and h and l together entail that Lewis did not raise his hand. But 
Lewis was free in keeping his hand down. He was able to raise his hand; he just 
didn’t exercise that ability.  
Now, Lewis asks what would have been the case had he raised his hand. 
There are three possibilities. Either contradictions would have been true, or h 
would have been false, or l would have been false. The first is easily dismissed. 
Lewis also dismisses the second, noting that if he had raised his hand, the intrinsic 
state of the world long ago would not have been different. Only the third option 
remains. Had Lewis raised his hand, l would have been false. The laws of nature 
would have been different from what they actually are.  
Now for the crucial part. Facing another incredulous stare, Lewis addresses 
the worry that this description of the case means that he is able to break the laws 
                                                                
33 Kieran Setiya, in “Believing at Will,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (2008): 36-52, 
endorses an intention-based conception of believing at will, on which being able to believe at 
will involves being able to believe as a result of an intention to so believe. Then, if one takes the 
deontological conception of epistemic justification to require agents to be able to believe at will, 
we get the result that it requires agents to be able to form beliefs as a result of intentions to form 
those beliefs. 
34 See David Lewis, “Are We Free to Break the Laws?” Theoria 47 (1981): 113-21. 
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of nature. Lewis replies that he is not committed to the strong thesis that he is able 
to break a law, but only to the weak thesis that he is able to do something such 
that, if he did it, something that it a law in the actual world would have been 
broken. In the nearest world in which Lewis raises his hand, it is not the case that 
something which is a law of nature in that world is broken. Rather it is the case 
that something which is a law of nature in the actual world would be broken, and 
hence was never a law in the nearest Lewis-hand-raising world in the first place.  
Something similar is going on in the belief case. Suppose, to use our earlier 
example, you actually accept all and only bets on tritium atom decay where n is 
greater than or equal to 0.5. Given our stipulation that other factors on which 
your beliefs supervene are neutral with respect to which beliefs or credences you 
count as having, this means that you actually have 0.5 credence that a given 
tritium atom will decay within 12.26 years. But you could have bet otherwise, 
accepting all and only the bets where n is greater than or equal to 0.25. Had you 
done so, you would have counted as having 0.25 credence that a given tritium 
atom will decay within 12.26 years. This is a case where your ability to affect your 
beliefs is somewhat akin to Lewis’ ability to break the laws. In the nearest world 
in which you accept all and only bets where n is greater than or equal to 0.25, it is 
not true in that world that you caused your present credence in a tritium atom’s 
decaying within 12.26 years to go from 0.5 to 0.25 as a result of a decision you 
made to come to have 0.25 credence in that proposition. Rather, in that world, 
you did something such that, given that you did it, you count as having already 
had the 0.25 credence in the first place.  
So all that follows from the pragmatic picture of belief is that there are cases 
where at t you are able to do something such that, if you do it, you will count as 
having one set of beliefs at t, and you are able to something else such that, if you 
do that other thing, you will count as having some other set of beliefs at t. It does 
not follow from the pragmatic picture of belief that there are cases where you can 
be interpreted as having decided or intended to believe some proposition p and 
thereby coming to believe p. The pragmatic picture of belief does not 
straightforwardly rule out the latter possibility; it just doesn’t by itself entail that it 
is possible. Whether coming to believe p as a result of deciding to do so is possible 
on the pragmatic theory depends on the specifics on the version of the pragmatic 
theory in question. In particular, it will depend on the requirements of rationality 
that our imagined ideal interpreter seeks to interpret agents as satisfying, and on 
the different weights assigned to these different requirements in cases where 
satisfying one requirement entails violating another.  
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However, let me briefly explain why I suspect that on most plausible 
versions of the pragmatic theory, it will come out impossible to believe some 
proposition p as a result of an intention or decision to believe p. Why should this 
be impossible? Couldn’t you intend at t to believe p at a slightly later time t+, 
know that -ing at t+ would be best explained and rationalized by your believing 
p at t+, and then  at t+, thereby bringing it about that you believe p at t+? 
Arguably not. For holding fixed that you intended at t to believe p at t+, it is 
likely that your subsequent -ing at t+ would be best explained and rationalized 
not by your believing p at t+, but rather by your merely desiring to believe p at 
t+, or perhaps desiring to appear to others as if you believed p. The interpreter 
would attribute to you a desire to believe p (or something along those lines) while 
refraining from attributing to you the belief itself. (Alternatively, our interpreter 
might attribute to you the belief that p at t+ but then not interpret you as having 
intended at t to come to believe p. After all, as noted earlier, most defenders of the 
pragmatic picture will hold that for many if not all contentful mental states, 
including not just beliefs but also intentions, whether you have that mental state is 
determined by how well attributing to you that mental state would rationalize and 
explain your behavior.)35 
Suppose that this is right and the pragmatic picture does in fact rule out the 
possibility of intending or deciding to believe some proposition and thereby 
                                                                
35 There are some worries about this explanation of why it should be impossible to form beliefs 
as a result of an intention to do so. Presumably, the idea behind thinking that an interpreter 
would prefer interpreting you as desiring to be believe p at t+ rather than as actually believing 
p at that time is that, given the rest of your situation, the belief that p wouldn’t be rational. But 
why should that be the case? Perhaps it’s because such a belief would have to be based on 
merely pragmatic, non-evidential reasons. But even if such beliefs are irrational, it might be that 
in the case under consideration, you have evidential, non-pragmatic reasons to decide to try to 
get yourself to come to believe p. For instance, you might recognize that your evidence supports 
p but find yourself unable to believe p just as a result of your ordinary passive belief-formation 
processes. You might recognize that your evidence suggests that climate change is caused by 
human activities but find that your anti-intellectual upbringing is keeping you from responding 
in the normal way to this evidence and believing in man-made climate change. In such a case, 
intending to get yourself to come to believe in man-made climate change would involve 
responding to evidential rather than pragmatic reasons. Second, even if it irrational to believe 
on the basis of pragmatic reasons, it is not clear that this irrationality is so egregious as to 
outweigh any explanatory benefits that might be gained by interpreting you as having done so. 
The pragmatic theory allows for the possibility of interpreting you as having irrational beliefs or 
performing irrational actions in other contexts, so why not this one? I leave these questions 
open at present.  
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coming to believe it. This yields a form of doxastic voluntarism on which your 
ability to determine what you believe parallels the ability that Lewis thinks you 
have to break the laws. There will be cases where by doing one thing at t, you will 
count as having one set of beliefs at t, and by doing some other thing, you will 
count as having some other set of beliefs, even though it is impossible for you to 
have some set of beliefs as a result of an intention to do so.  
However, it is possible to resist the assumption that the deontological 
conception of epistemic justification requires the sort of voluntary control in 
which you can form beliefs on the basis of belief-forming intentions. In fact, 
Alston himself considers a different kind of voluntary control that may suffice for 
defending the deontological conception. He calls it ‘indirect voluntary control.’36 
Here is how he puts it:  
We can be held responsible for a state of affairs that results from our actions even 
if we did not produce that state of affairs intentionally, provided it is the case 
that something we did (didn’t do) and should have not done (done) was a 
necessary condition (in the circumstances) of the realisation of that state of 
affairs, i.e., provided that state of affairs would not have obtained had we not 
done (done) something we should not have done (done)... This suggests that even 
if propositional attitudes are not under our effective voluntary control, we might 
still be held responsible for them, provided we could and should have prevented 
them; provided there is something we could and should have done such that if 
we had done it we would not have had the attitude in question.37 
In this passage, Alston is suggesting that the deontological conception of 
epistemic justification may only require that we have voluntary control over 
(some of) our beliefs in the following sense: one has voluntary control over 
whether believes p iff one has voluntary control over whether one does something 
(intentionally) which is a necessary condition (in the circumstances) of believing 
p.   
But this kind of voluntary control over beliefs is precisely the kind that 
follows from the pragmatic picture of belief (or so I have argued). Take a case 
where one will count as believing p if and only if one ’s. Then, one has voluntary 
control over whether one believes p, provided one also has the ability to 
(intentionally)  and the ability to (intentionally) not-. For one has voluntary 
control over whether one does something (namely ) which is a necessary 
condition (in the circumstances) of believing p.  
                                                                
36 Alston, “The Deontological Conception,” 277. 
37 Alston, “The Deontological Conception,” 278. 
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Admittedly, Alston didn’t have in mind the peculiar sort of voluntary 
control over beliefs that follows from the pragmatic picture when he wrote his 
article. He was conceiving of our indirect voluntary control over beliefs as 
stemming from our ability to take actions (he mentions training oneself to be 
more critical of gossip as an example) that are within one’s power to do and which 
causally affect one’s later belief formation. By contrast, the indirect voluntary 
control over beliefs resulting from the pragmatic picture is one on which we are 
able to take actions which constitutively make a difference to one’s beliefs. Still, 
insofar as indirect voluntary control over beliefs, as characterized by Alston in the 
quote above, is sufficient to defend the deontological conception of epistemic 
justification, the pragmatic picture of belief can provide refuge to epistemic 
deontologists.  
Now, even if one insists that this indirect sort of voluntary control doesn’t 
merit the name and isn’t voluntary control at all, I think that the pragmatic 
picture can still help vindicate our doxastic responsibility. (We might then be 
thought of as having a form of ‘doxastic freedom’ while lacking voluntary control 
over beliefs.38) Suppose that in fact your evidence supports believing p, and that if 
p is true, then -ing is the action that would best satisfy your desires.39 Let us also 
suppose that you in fact don’t ; instead you . And attributing to you a lack of 
belief in p (either a belief in not-p or suspension of judgment) is part of the best 
explanation and rationalization of your -ing. And suppose further that, were you 
to have -ed, then attributing to you the belief that p would have been part of the 
best explanation of rationalization of your -ing (after all, this belief would itself 
be rational, i.e. supported by your evidence, and would rationalize your actions). 
Then, we can say that you ought to have believed that p, and that you were free to 
have done so. For had you acted in the way that your evidence suggested was best 
(i.e. had you -ed), then you would have counted as believing that p, and you had 
the freedom to .40 
                                                                
38 See Sharon Ryan, “Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief,” Philosophical Studies 114 
(2003): 47-79, Conor McHugh, “Exercising Doxastic Freedom,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 88 (2014): 1-37, and Matthias Steup, “Doxastic Voluntarism and 
Epistemic Deontology,” Acta Analytica 15 (2000): 25-56.  
39 I’m holding fixed what your desires are for the sake of this example, though according to the 
pragmatic picture, what your desires are also depends in part on how you act. 
40 Again, it won’t always be the case that you would have counted as believing differently had 
you acted differently, for in some cases other facts having to do with your evidence and your 
emotions, for instance, will overdetermine what you count as believing. But most philosophers, 
including Alston (“The Deontological Conception,” 262) have thought that you needn’t always 
have freedom or voluntary control over your beliefs in order for deontic concepts to be 
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Conclusion 
Lack of voluntary control over beliefs is largely taken for granted in contemporary 
philosophy. But many philosophers also espouse theories of the nature of belief 
that involve a tight conceptual link between belief and action. In particular, many 
hold that what it is for an agent to have a given belief is in part for her to act in 
ways that would satisfy her desires if that belief were true. More generally, they 
hold that what it is for you to have a given set of mental states, including beliefs, is 
for attribution of those mental states to constitute (part of) an optimal explanation 
of your behavior. On such a pragmatic theory of (many) mental states, your 
actions are part of the supervenience base for your mental states, including your 
beliefs. But given that your actions are under your control, this means that some 
of the factors on which your beliefs supervene are under your control, and so 
there are possible cases in which you can affect what you count as believing by 
how you act. These cases are likely rare, and perhaps even non-actual, but they 
are possible nonetheless.  
However, the sense in which your beliefs can in some cases be under your 
control differs from the sense in which some philosophers often think of 
voluntary control. The pragmatic theory of belief does not entail that there are 
possible cases in which you affect what you believe by way of a decision or 
intention to come to have that belief. Rather, the form of voluntary control over 
your beliefs entailed by the pragmatic theory of belief is like the form of voluntary 
control over the laws of nature entailed by Lewis’ compatibilism. According to the 
latter, you are able to do something such that, were you to do it, the laws of nature 
would be different from what they would be if you didn’t, but there is no world in 
which you break the laws of nature in that world. According to the former, you 
are able to do something such that, were you to do it, your beliefs would be 
different from what they would be if you didn’t, but there may be no world in 
which you form a given belief as a result of a decision to do so. 
Nevertheless, I have suggested that the sort of voluntary control that 
follows from the pragmatic picture (which might be thought of as a form of 
Alston’s ‘indirect voluntary control’) may be enough to vindicate our doxastic 
responsibility and hence the deontological conception of epistemic justification. 
                                                                                                                                       
applicable to beliefs; it is enough that you sometimes, or at least often, have such freedom or 
voluntary control. 
